

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER:  
AN OVERVIEW

By

Andrés Solimano<sup>1</sup>

Macroeconomics and Growth  
Development Economics Research Group

The World Bank

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## 1. Introduction

Global capitalism, vintage early 21<sup>st</sup> century, favors more the movement of goods and capital across national borders than the movement of people. This was not always this way. The first wave of globalization of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century came along with massive international migration. Around 60 million migrants from Europe went to the countries of the New World (Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and the United States) over a period of 40 years or so.

While there is consensus on the benefits of an open trade regime and a relatively liberal capital movements, that consensus rarely extends to free movement of people across countries. This paradox regarding the differences in the “freedom to become global” between human-made objects (goods and money) and actual people, makes for an interesting phenomena to be understood and explained. This paper reviews the issue by looking at both standard trade theory, basically the Mundell theorem of trade and migration as *substitutes* the ensuing analytical developments and empirical evidence around the Mundell result. Then, the paper looks at this asymmetry of the current global economic order from the angle of considerations of freedom, individual rights and transnational citizenship as well as the potential of international migration to reduce global inequalities.

Historically, in the first wave of globalization of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century until 1914 or so, the expansion of international trade and capital mobility, because of reduced transport costs, came along with mass migration. In that period, the direction of the migration flows was mainly from Europe to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the U.S. and Canada. An important effect of international migration in that period was to contribute to convergence of per capita national income levels and factor prices in the “Atlantic Economy” in that period.

In the current wave of globalization, the direction of migration is predominantly South - North, say from Asia, Africa and Latin America to the U.S. and Western Europe, although some recent important migration flows have been “North- South” as it was the

case of the massive immigration from Russia to Israel in the early to mid 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, migration flows although not reaching the proportions of the first globalization wave, have been significant. In particular, during the 1990s, with a booming U.S. economy, the migration flows to the U.S. increased quite sharply, particularly from Mexico, Central America and Asia. Interestingly, increased trade and capital mobility seems to be associated with *more* rather than less migration (as the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell theory would have suggested). In fact, both analytical and empirical work on international migration in recent decades suggest that trade and migration tend to be complementary phenomena.

This paper, organized in eight sections including this introduction, reviews a broad range of conceptual, policy issues and empirical evidence on the relationship between globalization and international migration. Section 2 provides empirical evidence on the flows on international migration since the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century to the late 20<sup>th</sup> century; the magnitude and evolution of foreign population in OECD countries and some socio-economic characteristics of migrants (to the U.S.).

Section 3 focuses on the determinants of international migration and its skill composition. Is international migration (or migration rates) dominated by the movement of unskilled labor? How important is the migration of professionals and highly-educated people nowadays, say brain-drain type of migration? Empirical evidence on international migration and its skill composition to the United States during the 1990s is provided here as well as evidence on mass migration of well-educated people from Russia to Israel in the early 1990s. The section also presents the relationship between trade and migration both from the viewpoint of the predictions of theory and the historical evidence on the subject. Then, section 4 turns to the evolution of policies and public attitudes toward migration in the countries of the New World since the 19<sup>th</sup> century up to the present through different periods of world economic history.

In section 5, the paper discusses the links between migration, growth, convergence and global and national (within country) inequality. What is the impact of migration on the rate of economic growth in both recipient and sending countries? Does growth precede migration or, conversely, does migration precede growth? Does

migration, particularly of unskilled labor amplifies (reduces) existing inequality in receiving (sending) countries? What is the role of migration in driving convergence of incomes/real wages across sending and receiving countries?

Finally the paper (sections 6 and 7 ) discusses two separate issues related to migration: humanitarian crisis (of increasing occurrence in the 1990s) and the role of considerations of freedom, individual rights and transnational citizenship in assessing international migration. The paper concludes, in section 8, with closing remarks about the main findings of this study.

## **2. A Look at the Evidence on International Migration: 1820-1998**

Historically, periods of growing international trade and capital mobility have been accompanied by increasing –rather than declining—flows of international migration. In fact, as mentioned before, it is estimated that around 60 million Europeans migrated to the labor-scarce, resource abundant New World countries (U.S., Canada, Argentina, Brazil and Australia) in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, in what is considered the “age of mass migration” (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). As shown in Table 1, from 1870-1920 more than 26 millions of migrants from all over the world went to the US. That period, up to the onset of World War I, known also by economic historians as the first wave of globalization, was also a period of rapid growth of international trade, boosted by a decline in transport and communication costs associated with the development of the railway systems, steam-ship, electricity and the telegraph. More recently, during the second wave of globalization, an increase in international migration to the U.S. is observed in the 1980s and 1990s vis a vis previous decades. In fact, while there were about 1 million migrants per decade in the 1940s and 2.5 million migrants in the 1950s, immigration rose to near 7.5 million migrants per decade in the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, say the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1).

It is interesting to notice that while most of the migration in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the main receiving country of the New World, say the United States, were Europeans (slightly more than 91 percent of total migration in the period 1820-1870 and 88 percent of total migration in the period 1820-1920), that percentage of European migration to the

U.S. declined to around 14 percent in the period 1971-1998. The main source region of immigration to the U.S. was Latin America (46 percent of the total), followed by immigration from Asia (34 percent) in the period 1971-98. In terms of individual countries and for the whole period of 179 years (1820-1998) shown in Table 1, Mexico, Cuba and the Dominican Republic are the principal Latin American sending countries of immigrants to the US. The main Asian sending countries were the Philippines, China, Korea and India, and the main European sending countries are Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Ireland.

Immigration flows represented, on average, around 7 percent of the total population of the U.S. in the period 1871-1920; later on that percentage declined to 2.5 percent in the last third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Table 2 shows an important increase in estimated illegal migration in the U.S. during the 1990s, from 3.3 millions in 1992 to 5 millions in 1996. As for legal migration in the last decades, Latin American countries are the principal origins of illegal immigrants in the US, with the largest contingents of illegal migrants coming from Mexico. It's interesting to note that Mexican illegal immigrants are not only the largest group (with a share of 75 percent in 1996) , but they also present the highest growth rate (104 percent) of increase in a period of only four years. Other important sending countries of illegal immigrants are El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Canada and the Philippines.

For the rest of OECD countries, the share of foreign population over total population of the receiving country has been rising in the period 1988-1997, in particular for Austria, Denmark and Luxembourg. As shown in table 2, this share was the highest in Luxemburg (34.9 percent), followed by Australia (21.1 percent, data for 1996), Switzerland (19 percent) and Canada (17.4 percent, data for 1996). In turn, OECD countries with less than 3 percent of foreign population are Japan, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Appendix Table A-1 presents information on the nationality of the foreign population for selected OECD countries. The composition of the foreign population of

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<sup>2</sup> Looking at a 'stock measure', when considering the period 1820-1870, the immigrant population to the U.S. represented on average, roughly, 32 percent of the total U.S. population.

these countries reveals the importance of factors such as distance and to some extent language (and/or cultural affinities) in the decision to migrate. That may explain, for instance, that 60 percent of Japan's foreign population in 1997 was from Korea and China (75 percent if the Philippines is also included), that 71 percent of Luxembourg's foreign population this year was from Portugal, Italy, France and Belgium, and that 25 percent of the foreign population in the US in 1990 was from Mexico and Canada. Another interesting feature is the high presence of African (mostly from Morocco) in some European countries. That is the case of France, for which almost a 40 percent of its total foreign population in 1997 was from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and the case of Netherlands and Spain for which 20 percent and 18 percent of their respective foreign populations were from Morocco this year. Finally, Turkish and former Yugoslavian populations are also shown to be important in most European countries. For instance, Turkish present a share of 29 percent of the total foreign population in Germany in 1997, 17 percent in Netherlands, and 15 in Denmark, while former Yugoslavian represent 23 percent of the total foreign population in Switzerland in 1997, 14 percent in Denmark and 10 percent in Germany.

Regarding the skill composition and other socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants of the 1990s to the U.S.<sup>3</sup>, table 4 and 5 show some interesting features.

In terms of educational attainment, the Hispanic population has, in general, lower shares of people with high school and BA degrees than other populations living in the US (Asian and Afro-American, see Table 4). The exception is the Afro-American population, which has in general a lower share of people with high school degrees than the Hispanic one. In contrast, Asians show better educational attainment levels than whites, Hispanics and Afro-Americans. It is interesting to note, however, the great disparities among the Hispanic population in terms of education, being the Cubans (and Other Hispanic too) the group with the highest shares of educated people and the Mexicans the one with the lowest shares.<sup>4</sup>

With respect to the economic conditions of these populations, Table 5 shows that the Hispanic population have similar median incomes than the Afro-American one, but

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<sup>3</sup> Similar information is not available for the rest of the OECD countries.

incomes of about 60 percent and 54 percent of the White and Asian population's incomes respectively. At the same time, the share of Hispanic families living below the poverty level (25 percent, again similar to the share for the Afro-American population) is almost 3 times the share of the White population and more than twice the one for the Asian population living below the poverty level. This income pattern is consistent not only with their educational level, but also with the unemployment rates of these populations. The Hispanic group presents similar unemployment rates than the Afro-American one, and higher rates than for the White and Asian groups<sup>5</sup>. In turn, the Asian population presents higher level of education and median income than the White one, although a bigger share of families living below the poverty level and a slightly bigger unemployment rate too than the White population.

### **3. Who Migrates and Why ?**

Most of the time, people migrate abroad in search for better economic opportunities for the migrants and their families offered by foreign countries compared with the economic opportunities found at home. In fact, unemployment, low wages, meager career prospects for highly educated people, significant country risk for national investors in the home country are all factors that propel people to emigrate abroad. In addition, there are non-economic reasons to emigrate such as war, ethnic discrimination, political persecution at home, etc. It is worth noting that these factors were important in the 1990s in Africa (e.g. Somalia, Rwanda crisis), in the Balkans and former Yugoslavia, in some former Soviet Republics, in Colombia, in South America.

In addition, the choice of the country of immigration is often dictated by the existence of a network of family, friends and connections that have previously migrated to that specific country.<sup>6</sup> An interesting question on the magnitude of the flows of

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<sup>4</sup> Another alternative comparison would be to compare education attainment and other socio-economic characteristics of foreign population with respect to reference groups in the sending countries.

<sup>5</sup> As for the educational level, we observe that among the Hispanic population, Cubans and Mexicans are the groups with better-off and worse-off economic conditions, respectively.

<sup>6</sup> More formally, migration equations usually include as determinants the following variables: real wage (or real per capita income) differential between sending and receiving countries, a lagged migration variable capturing persistence effects and possibly social network considerations, and a one or two decade-lagged demographic variable.

international migration is posed by Borjas (1999): why, given very sizeable wage differentials between countries (for example, while Sweden's per-capita income is about US\$ 25,000 per year, Ethiopia's is just around US\$ 100 per annum<sup>7</sup>) we don't observe larger flows of international migration between the two nations? In other words why we do observe *too little* international migration? Borjas' emphasizes the role of cultural differences across countries—language, traditions, family relationships — as an important dampening factor to international migration. Another explanation, complementary to the cultural factor, is policies. If migration policies in host countries aren't favorable to immigration they can also deter migration but not completely as it seems implied by the rise in illegal migration to receiving countries observed in the 1990s. In fact, Hatton and Williamson (2000) discuss the low rates of emigration from Africa, given 'emigration fundamentals', that would call for much longer emigration flows from Africa than observed; an explanation for reduced migration from Africa is the existence of immigration restrictions that prevent African emigration. Another reason is that the costs of migrating are simply too high to be afforded by very poor African migrants.

Globalization and the development process in general alters, over time, the structure of production and the demand for labor. As incomes rise people consume more services: people travel more (the cost of air-traveling has substantially declined in recent years), go more often to restaurants, the entertainment industry expands, the demand for housing cleaning and maintenance services increase, etc. Some of these activities are very intensive in unskilled labor and these jobs are increasingly refused by nationals of rich countries. This provides an incentive for low-skill workers to migrate to higher income countries and enroll in these activities.

Under globalization, firms—often multinational corporations— are increasingly considering as an endogenous variable the location of production across the globe in response to country - differentials in the cost of labor (adjusted by productivity), in tax regimes, business regulations and in the overall investment climate. The fact is that manufacturing plants of international corporations are increasingly conducting production

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<sup>7</sup> Data from the World Development Indicators 2000 (The World Bank).

in low wage countries of Asia and Central America . This trend reduces the incentives for workers to emigrate as new job- opportunities are open at home.

In an attempt to identify the determinants and changes in skills of new migrants to the U.S. Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998) report the difficulties of making definite assessments on this matter without adequately considering the nature of the legal migration regime and migration data in the U.S. The data on immigrants captures *legal* migrants with the status of U.S. residents (people with “green cards”), a status often granted to the migrant after living and/or working in the U.S. for several years. The empirical analysis of the paper tends to show since the mid 1980s the average skill of new U.S. legal immigrants has risen relative to that of the U.S. population.<sup>8</sup> The authors mention also that these increases in the skills of new legal migrants are due in part to changes in immigration laws in the U.S. that favor the admittance of people with skill that are scarce in U.S. labor markets.

Another look at the issue is provided by Carrington and Detragiache (1998). These authors investigate the magnitude of the “brain drain” from developing countries through migration to developed economies. Using data of the U.S. Census of 1990 the authors find significant evidence of ‘brain drain’ from migrants coming from Caribbean, Central America and some Asian and African countries. This is a serious problem pointing towards a flight of human capital from developing countries.

A recent case of large scale (north-south) migration of highly educated people in the 1990s took place from Russia to Israel . In fact, from late 1989 through 1996, it estimated that 670,000 Russian Jews arrived to Israel, increasing the total Israeli population by 11 % and the labor force by 14 % (see Gandal, Hanson, Slaughter , 2000). The data reported in that study shows that the shares of the Russian population with college (university) education is considerable higher, in 1996, than the share of other Israeli workers and the total labor force with college education. Given the size of the Russian immigration and its degree of educational attainment, the immigration shock represented a substantial upgrading of the total labor force in Israel (and a relative downgrading of the labor force in the Russian economy and society).

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<sup>8</sup> From Table 4, we also observe an increase in the ratio of educated people of Hispanic to White population in the 1990s.

### a) What does Trade Theory say about Trade and Migration ?

In a classic article published in 1957, Nobel Prize Robert Mundell demonstrated, analytically, that under a set of special conditions (constant returns to scale, perfect competition, no distortions) international trade (movement of commodities) is a *substitute* for factor movements, including the movement of people. The main reason driving this result was that the equalization of factor prices through international trade would create no incentive for capital or labor (people) to move across national boundaries. Subsequently, the relaxation of some assumptions of the Mundell model regarding economies to scale, factor endowments, costs of mobility, distortions have shown that migration and trade can be *complements* rather than substitutes (see Schiff, 1996 and Faini, de Melo and Zimmermann, ch.1, 1999).

Moreover, the factor price equalization process through international trade may take a long time—several decades – to operate when there are large per-capita incomes differentials between the trading partners. For example, in the context of NAFTA while Mexico has a GDP per capita in 1999 of around U\$ 4,500 the per capita income of the U.S. is near U\$ 31,000<sup>9</sup> this year. That large income differential between two countries having a large common border generate very significant incentives for migration from Mexico to the U.S. In turn, such large income differentials are not uncommon among developed and developing countries so to generate powerful incentives for international migration.<sup>10</sup>

The Mundell result of trade as a substitute for migration provides a rationale for expecting that a reduction of trade restrictions in industrial countries can reduce the pressures for international migration. However trade opening may not be enough to dampen international migration to rich economies in view of the large income differentials between rich and poor countries we observe today in the world.

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<sup>9</sup> Data from the World Development Indicators 2000 (The World Bank).

<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that the fact the Mexican economy grew fast in the second half of the 1990s, must have helped to finance emigration, a process that entail various costs.

#### 4. The Evolution of Policies Towards Migration: Past and Present

It has been observed that policy regimes tend to be more open for international trade and capital movement than for immigration. Is that a correct characterization of reality? How have policies toward international migration evolved in the last century or so? What devices have (are) governments used (using), historically and currently, to either encourage or deter foreign immigration to their countries?

##### a) Immigration Policies in the First Wave of Globalization<sup>11</sup>

Let's start with a brief overview of the main migration policies in the countries of the New World in the mid-to-late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. By mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, *Argentina* granted land to facilitate immigrants to settle there and the government financed the costs of moving and housing for immigrants. The pro-migration climate of the ruling elite in Argentina at that time was captured by the phrase, coined by the Argentinean thinker Juan Baustista Alberdi, "To Govern is to Populate".<sup>12</sup> However, gradually, policies supporting immigration became less generous. In 1916, new legislation introduced restrictions for different classes of immigrants (e.g. disabled people, unaccompanied women with children, etc.) and by the 1920s policies became definitely less favorable for immigration as part of a global trend associated with less favorable economic conditions and the onset of nationalistic attitudes towards immigration. In *Australia*, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, immigration policies tended to favor those coming from British Commonwealth countries by subsidizing the transportation of immigrants and supporting them at arrival. At the same time they restricted the immigration of Chinese citizens through taxes and quotas. Some of these laws were repealed afterwards and then adopted again. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Australia naturalization laws became aligned with England's. *Brazil* also encouraged emigration and settlements through subsidies, special benefits for land acquisition and other budget support; in particular, it is considered that immigration helped to substitute the effects on

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<sup>11</sup> The main reference on immigration policies of the new world countries during the first wave of globalization is Timmer and Williamson (1996). More direct sources are Holloway (1997) for Brazil and Solberg (1970) for Argentina and Chile.

<sup>12</sup> See Solberg (1970).

labor supply of abolition of slavery in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, for the sugar –producing areas (north-east) and coffee-producing areas in the Sao-Paulo province.<sup>13</sup> Later on, like in the cases of Argentina and Australia, Brazilian, legislation became more restrictive in the first two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century *U.S.* immigration legislation went through different changes. It became federal rather than state legislation. Racial considerations were important: Chinese immigration was restricted in 1888 and the Chinese Exclusion Act suspended all Chinese immigration for 20 years. In 1917 a new Immigration Act established a literacy test for immigrants and in 1921 quotas were established to restrict immigration. In general immigrants from Canada, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the U.S. were treated more favorably than immigrants coming from Asian countries. In *Canada* by the 1860s the parliament granted autonomy to the provinces to handle immigration issues and policies. Land was offered at reduced prices to encourage immigrants to settle in Canada. In 1910 immigration from Asian countries was restricted through a higher head tax than that of immigrant of non-Asian countries.

Summing up, immigration policies in the countries of the New World were, on the whole, liberal in the 19<sup>th</sup> century; in addition, immigration flows were in several cases, promoted and encouraged by the governments of New World countries in response to the need for increased labor supply to support rapid economic expansion. However, these policies became gradually more restrictive towards the end of that century and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s. Ethnic discrimination (against migration from Asia, in particular from China) was a common practice, particularly in Australia, Canada and the US; a feature apparently absent in Argentinean and Brazilian immigration policies at that time.

### **b) Migration Policies in the Second Wave of Globalization: The Late 20<sup>th</sup> Century.**

The direction of international migration flows changed significantly during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As mentioned before, in the first wave of globalization migration was

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<sup>13</sup> See Holloway (1977).

mainly from east to west say from Europe to the U. S. and Canada and from north to south (from Europe, mainly, to Argentina, Australia, Brazil). In contrast, since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and intensified in the 1980s and 1990s -- the second wave of globalization-- the main flows of migration have been from Latin America, Africa and Asia to the US and Europe. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the soviet block, significant migration flows to western Europe (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom and Finland) and Israel have taken place from former socialist countries.

The main recipient country, the U.S. underwent significant changes in the legislation regarding migration since the 1960s.<sup>14</sup> The 1965 amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act was intended to facilitate migration to the U.S., ending ethnic discrimination biases of previous legislation. This new piece of legislation regulated immigration through a preference system according to family status regarding US citizens and encouraged immigrants with skills in short supply in the U.S. Nationality quotas were still in effect but an attempt was made to avoid ethnic discrimination. That legislation was changed again in 1986 in an attempt at trying to curb illegal immigration through tightened border control while at the same time creating schemes of regularization of aliens.<sup>15</sup> In turn, another law amendment in 1996 sought to further reduce illegal migration through a new Illegal Immigrant Reform and Responsibility Act.

The changes in immigration policies in the U.S. reflect the recognition of the incentives to migrate to the U.S. because of the economic opportunities available to everybody, including migrants; at the same time, this legislation tries to reduce illegal migration rather than focus in its ethnic composition as in the past.

In Europe, since the 1990s, immigration policies are increasingly defined at supra-national level by the European Union (EU). The main feature of EU migration policies is a sharp distinction between the EU and non-EU origin of the migrants. There is a dual EU immigration regime in which every EU citizen has full rights to reside and

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<sup>14</sup> For a discussion of U.S. immigration policies since the 1960s, see Sassen (1998) and Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998).

<sup>15</sup> People that benefited from this law in the U.S. obtained permit enabling them to remain in the country until they met the conditions for obtaining a permanent residence permit.

work in any country of the Union. In turn, citizens from non-EU countries face several restrictions to immigration and need working visas to reside legally and work in the EU.

During the 1990s, OECD countries have tended to favor trade agreements over common markets with third countries (taking the EU as a unity) as the latter arrangement would imply free immigration policies within a common market area. In the case of NAFTA, liberalization of trade and investment between the U.S. and Canada with Mexico did not include a relaxation of the barriers to entry of migrants from Mexico to the U.S. (rather NAFTA tightened them). In the case of the EU, an interesting case is Turkey, a country with large emigration flows towards Europe. The EU signed a trade agreement with Turkey but postponed, for later periods, negotiations for full membership in the EU.

In a recent paper, Wellish and Walz (1998) have explained the greater preference by receiving countries (e.g. the OECD) for free trade over free immigration in that the degree of domestic redistribution of income and social benefits is lower in the case of free trade. As domestic redistribution may hamper growth and pose an extra burden on the public finances of the host country, national governments in receiving countries tend to prefer free-trade over free-immigration.

## **5. Migration, Growth, Convergence and Inequality**

A traditional subject in the analysis of migration focuses on its impact on labor market variables such as unemployment levels and real wages of native workers in host countries. A more sympathetic attitude towards immigration tends to develop in booming periods of low unemployment and labor shortages in recipient countries; in turn, less favorable attitudes to migration arise in periods of slack and high unemployment. For example, the protracted period of prosperity and rapid growth of the U.S. economy in the 1990s has attracted significant migration to this country and, towards the end of the decade, generated a much more liberal political attitude towards immigration even by the labor unions, which have traditionally been hostile to immigration.

The impact of international migration on key variables such as the rate of economic growth and inequality (between and within countries) is the subject of the next two sections.

### a) Migration and Growth

The interaction between long run growth and migration is a complex issue. A first question is regarding causality. Does rapid growth in receiving countries invite more immigration? Conversely, what is the effect of migration on the rate of economic growth of receiving and sending countries?

Historically, say in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the economic opportunities opened in the growing, resource- rich, New World constituted a powerful magnet for immigration from, the labor abundant countries of Europe. So drawing from this historical experience, it is apparent that more rapid growth and expanding opportunities in the host country often *precedes* immigration.

In turn, immigration can be also a positive factor in boosting growth in receiving countries. There are several channels connecting migration with growth at work here, linked with both the labor market (for different skill levels) and the macroeconomics of savings and investment.

Starting with the labor market, international migration can ease labor market shortages therefore relaxing a labor constraint for growth, often present in relatively labor scarce economies. In fact, since the late 1990s, the U.S. companies in the information sector and communications equipment have employed intensively foreign computer engineers and information experts from India, China and other developing countries to keep up with the human resources requirements of a rapidly growing sector. In addition, back to history, the migration of people with entrepreneurial capacities and a favorable attitude towards risk-taking is likely to have contributed, positively, to wealth creation, colonization and innovation in the countries of the New World during the first wave of globalization.

Turning to the macroeconomics of saving and investment, another channel through which migration can increase growth in the host country is by moderating the growth of wages in a growing economy, therefore contributing to keep profits high rising

the profitability of *investment* and accelerating growth. This is an *investment-led growth* mechanism. Another mechanism from migration to growth may operate through *savings*. As international migration tends to rise profits in receiving countries and profit-earners have a larger propensity to save than wage earners, the net result is an increase in overall national savings and an increase in growth.<sup>16</sup> By a symmetric logic these mechanisms can account for a *growth-depressing effects* of emigration in *sending countries*.

The transfer of human capital and entrepreneurs from one country to the other can be predicted to have a positive growth effect in the recipient country and a negative growth effect in the sending country because the sending country loses scarce human capital, talented people and entrepreneurs. From the perspective of *world output* and to the extent that people move from countries with lower labor-productivity to countries with higher labor-productivity (because better organizational and institutional infrastructures, better technology or more capital per person) then the level of *world output* will increase with free international migration, although the distributional consequences of migration can be against the sending country that “export” scarce human capital and entrepreneurial talent.

There is no doubt that ‘brain drain’ is, indeed, a serious problem in many developing countries because of its adverse growth effects. However, restricting international migration of highly educated people seems unlikely to be the right solution. More sensible policies would be to create attractive economic conditions at home for highly educated people to stay in their home countries.

### **b) Migration and Convergence, Global and National Inequality**

In assessing the impact of migration on inequality an important distinction is between *global inequality*<sup>17</sup> and *national (within country) inequality*.<sup>18</sup> If international migration represents a movement of people from relatively low wage countries to nations

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<sup>16</sup> This assumes that all savings are automatically invested and that there are no Keynesian problems of transforming savings into growth because of deficient aggregate demand (See Solimano, 1996).

<sup>17</sup> Lindert and Williamson (2000) show that while in the last two hundred years national (within country) inequality has remained more or less constant, inequality across countries has increased significantly.

<sup>18</sup> See Solimano (1998, 2000) for an analysis of national inequality from the viewpoint of the theory of distributive justice and the links between growth and inequality under alternative growth model closures.

with higher wages, international migration will contribute to reduce global inequality (at least of labor incomes) by reducing the real wage gaps between sending and receiving countries. This is in turn, a key element in the whole discussion about *convergence*. O'Rourke and Williamson (2000, ch. 2) report that around 60 percent of the wage convergence in the "Atlantic Economy" (Europe, U.S., Canada) between 1870 and 1900 is explained by the collapse of the wage gap between Europe and the New World following massive international migration from Europe to the New World. The authors mention that the story of convergence is one of lower real wages in labor abundant Europe catching-up to the higher wages of workers in the labor scarce New World. In addition, within the New World, lower-wages countries such as Argentina and Canada were catching up with higher-wages countries such as the U.S. and Australia. In addition, the authors argue for a positive correlation between globalization (late 19<sup>th</sup> century and mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century ) and convergence with convergence interrupted with the de-globalization of the inter-war period , say from 1914 and 1950. Interestingly, the authors argue that both migration *and* trade were the critical factors contributing to convergence (see ch.9), with capital flows playing little or no role in income convergence.

Another important discussion is the effect of migration and, more generally of globalization, on national income distribution (particularly of labor incomes). In the 1980s and 1990s, it has been observed in countries such as the U.S. an increase in wage inequality coinciding with greater external integration (globalization) of the U.S. economy. In turn, a similar discussion took place in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century in the U.S. in which mass immigration is attributed to have played an important role in keeping domestic real wages of unskilled labor from rising in spite of a booming economy.

The explanations for the rising wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s and its possible links with globalization has been explored under different analytical frameworks with relatively inconclusive results. Borjas (1994, 1999) shows that globalization is associated with a worsening of wage differentials for unskilled labor in the U.S. in the last two decades; part of this trend is related to globalization forces, with migration explaining around two-thirds of that increase in wage inequality and trade the other third. It is important to observe, though, that others factors such as technological change –e.g.

the information revolution- have probably contributed to wage inequality if technical progress saves unskilled labor and increases the demand for high-skill labor. In fact, it seems that the studies that give more importance in explaining the increase in wage inequality in the U.S. to technical change than trade integration have often disregarded the effect of migration as an important globalization factor.

Theory suggests that migration, of predominantly unskilled labor, reduces the supply of this class of labor in the sending country, therefore rising the salaries of unskilled workers and narrowing wage income distribution, therefore generating an egalitarian trend in the sending countries (though at lower per-capita income levels if emigration reduces growth at home). However, these trends need to be confirmed empirically for developing countries and the empirical evidence seem to be scarce in this realm.

## **6. Migration and Humanitarian Crisis**

An important cause of international migration during the 1990s is associated with humanitarian crisis, often referred as the problem of “refugees” and/or “asylum seekers”. This is not causally related to globalization in a direct way but humanitarian crisis have become more frequent in the current era of globalization. As table 6 shows, the total number of asylum-seekers in OECD countries increased from 435,000 people in 1989 to 839,000 in 1992 (peak year) and declined to its level of the late 1980s by the end of the 1990s. In terms of individual countries, Germany and the United States stand out as the main receivers of asylum-seekers in that period. Also from Table 6, we can observe that the relative importance of asylum seekers with respect to the total inflows of foreign population has been increasing for some countries during the last three years, particularly for Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> This could be associated to the following phenomenon. As immigration controls of different countries have been tightened during the last years in order to reduce illegal immigration, it has been observed (in Europe and in the US) that immigrants -with no possibilities of legally entering a country- have started to claim for entrance under the asylum seeker status. Given the nature of this claim, hard to deny and also difficult to verify as sometimes asylum seekers arrive at the borders with no documentation at all, this pose a problem to the receiving countries, which must allow the asylum seekers to stay during the period their status is processed (confirmed or denied). This creates incentives for the illegal immigrants to enter as

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s gave rise to a complex process of nation-building in the former soviet republics that was often accompanied by large flows of migration across former soviet republics, and the massive emigration of Jewish population to Israel that we documented before.

Another example of the disintegration of a nation-states in the 1990s was the former Yugoslavia, a move that engendered both war, ( Bosnia, Kosovo ) and massive migration among states of the former Yugoslavian Federation. In fact, for most of the countries presented in Table 6, the peak observed in 1992 is principally explained by asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia. Appendix Table A-2 present the composition of asylum seekers, by nationality, for some selected OECD countries.

In turn, acute ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone and other African countries generated massive internal displacement of population and international migration in the 1990s of people escaping from armed conflict and prosecution. Part of the exodus went to other countries of Africa and to OECD countries (see Hatton and Williamson, 2000). In 2000, there were refugees crisis in Afghanistan , East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo.<sup>20</sup> In the Latin American context, the intensification of the internal war in Colombia, particularly in the late 1990s also produced internal displacements of more than a million and a half of Colombian moving away from areas of armed conflict.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, large contingents of Colombians are migrating to the U.S., Spain, Central America and other destinations. In contrast, it is interesting to notice that the end of the civil wars in Central America in the early 1990s in countries such as El Salvador, did not produce a movement of migrants back to their home country. Most Salvadoran that emigrated to the United States during its civil wars of the 1980s did not return home after the conflict ceased. An irreversibility feature in international migration is clearly noticeable.

The occurrence of large migration flows during humanitarian crisis is a relevant topic that clearly deserves more analysis both at the level of empirically documenting its magnitude, composition, place of destination, etc, as well as in highlighting policy

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asylum seekers. Also, because by the time their status is defined, they usually have already settled (get a job, start paying taxes , etc), it makes it more difficult deportation to their country of origin.

<sup>20</sup> See New York Times, December 2000.

<sup>21</sup> See Solimano (2001).

responses to the phenomena. Clearly, discussions on international architecture—that have so far privileged financial architecture—must include also the design of institutional settings to prevent and then manage, when they occur, massive emigration flows —or refugees crisis -- associated with either armed conflict and/or natural disasters.

## 7. Freedom, Rights and International Migration

International migration involves not only economic considerations but also touches some basic issues of freedom and individual rights. A consistent view of freedom must encompass not only freedom of choice of consumption goods, freedom of which schools to send our children but also the freedom of choice of where to live and work. The later choice, in general, does not arise much controversy if exercised at the level of the nation-state; in this case, it is now conceded as a basic individual right.<sup>22</sup> Some have argued , further, that people also must be granted a universal right to choose, in the planet, their country of residence in a sort of *transnational citizenship* (see Stuccliffe, 1998, and Baubock, 1994, for discussions on this concept). This issue can also be linked to the topics of exclusion and discrimination. Immigrants (let alone illegal immigrants) in general do not enjoy the same political rights such as voting and being elected for public office as natives.<sup>23</sup> Another issue for discussion is the access of immigrants to social services and welfare benefits in the recipient migration country. As discussed before an important reason for public attitudes against immigration is the added burden on the (welfare) state in the receiving country associated with the provision of social benefits to migrants. Nevertheless, it is worth considering that illegal migrants in countries such as the U.S. (and possibly in other countries as well) pay taxes, irrespective of their legal immigration status.

This discussion of the public finances consequences of migration, however important, is basically instrumental. From the viewpoint of rights (to choose where to

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<sup>22</sup> This was not always the case. In the period of slavery, this (and other rights) to slaves were denied. In more recent times, in socialist countries workers needed a permission of the state to move within their countries for work reasons; in addition emigration outside their countries was strongly curtailed by the state.

reside in the planet), critical considerations go beyond the fiscal aspects of immigration and touches upon issues of international citizenry and “cosmopolitan rights”, an area in flux in which consensus is still far from being obtained.

A somewhat related issue is the control of illegal emigration and the effectiveness of borders control. Empirical evidence suggests that the actual effectiveness of border controls in stemming illegal immigration is limited.<sup>24</sup>

An interesting theme is the differences between a “rights perspective” and an “economic perspective” on migration. A ranking of “freedom to move around the globe” would attach higher values to commodities than people, with goods and money having greater freedom to move than people (using Marx’s terminology, this is a sort of ‘commodity fetishism’, at global level). In turn, people with higher skills, better marketable knowledge and more wealth have more freedom to move (in the sense of facing less restrictions to immigration in receiving countries) than unskilled people and ill-people (e.g. people with HIV/AIDS). An economic viewpoint would rationalize along efficiency and externality lines some of these differences in “freedom to become global” so to say; however, some of these differences in the ability to exercise freedom in globalization can be hard to justify from a perspectives of individual rights.

## 8. Concluding Remarks

This paper reviewed a host of issues involving international migration, globalization, and the global economic order. International migration can be evaluated in terms of its economic effects on global and national inequality, incomes convergence, long run growth and public finances in both receiving and sending countries; in addition, a further perspective on international migration is linked to issues of individual rights, freedom to move across the planet and “global citizenship”. A global economic order encompasses all these dimensions.

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<sup>23</sup> As suggested in Tables 4 and 5, immigrants in general are also discriminated in wages and access to jobs,. They tend to receive lower wages than the native population for roughly similar jobs and have higher rates of unemployment.

<sup>24</sup> Hanson, Robertson and Spillinbergo (1999) study the effect of U.S.– Mexico border control and find that border enforcement has minimal effect of illegal migration and that immigration from Mexico has a reduced effect on wages in U.S. border cities.

This paper shows that global capitalism, early 21<sup>th</sup> century, is more favorable, at the level of policies, to the movement of goods and capital than the movement of people across the globe. In a sense, the degree of “cosmopolitan liberalism”<sup>25</sup> of current globalization is less in the dimension of international migration. Economically, preventing factor (labor or human capital) movements from lower to higher productivity activities (countries) may entail a *global welfare loss* in terms of foregone world output (although the distributive consequences for sending and receiving countries vary).

International migration was more important in the first wave of globalization of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century than in the current wave of global capitalism. In the last 150 years of world economic history, public policies toward migration have experienced large swings. They were, in general, relatively liberal, though with ethnic discrimination in the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century (particularly in Australia, United States and Canada); then gradually those policies became more restrictive in receiving countries with a severe tightening of immigration in the inter-war period of 1914-1950. In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, like before, immigration policies in industrial countries have become significantly influenced by business cycle and unemployment considerations; periods of booming growth and high employment (e.g. the U.S. in the late 1990s) have created a more favorable attitude towards immigration by politicians, labor unions and policy-makers. However, this may change again with a downturn in the U.S. and other major economies.

The empirical evidence for the U.S. shows a steady trend of increased immigration in the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a trend that accelerates towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, immigration rose from around 2.9 million people in the 1950-60s per decade to an average of around 7.5 million in the 1980-90s. However, as a share of the total population of the U.S. these immigration flows are around a 40 percent of what they were in the period 1871-1920.

In terms of the socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants, the data for the U.S. shows lower median incomes, lower levels of educational attainment (high school

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<sup>25</sup> The phrase was coined by Harry Johnson in a paper on international migration written in the mid 1960s (see references).

and B.A. degrees) and higher poverty incidence in Hispanics residing in the U.S. than in Asians and Whites (but higher or similar than in Afro-Americans).

The early Mundell view of trade as a substitute for migration dominated the perceptions of economists on the matter for a while. However, subsequent analytical work and empirical evidence show that, historically, periods of rapid expansion of international trade (late 19<sup>th</sup> century and late 20<sup>th</sup> century globalization waves) came along also with an *increase* in international migration. The view of trade as a substitute for migration has a clear policy implication: trade opening in rich countries as a way to reduce migration pressures. Nevertheless, large initial per-capita income and big real wage differentials among rich and poor countries create significant incentives to migrate, in spite of increased trade volumes and a more open trade regime (e.g. NAFTA). Another possible alternative is increased foreign aid to improve economic conditions in sending countries as a deterrent to international migration.

The empirical evidence tends to show a positive correlation between globalization and international income convergence across countries of the New World in the first wave of globalization and among OECD countries in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nevertheless, when including developing countries, the picture of convergence is less clear. Globalization has been associated with a narrowing of gaps in per-capita income between rich countries and rapidly growing economies of East Asia, Chile, and others during the last two to three decades. Nevertheless, income divergence has been the case for Sub-Saharan Africa, several former socialist countries and Russia, and other developing countries. Moreover, the evidence attaches a greater contribution to international migration than trade and financial globalization to international incomes convergence across nations, particularly in the first wave of globalization.

From the viewpoint of world distribution of income, international migration tends to *reduce* income disparities *across countries*, a feature worth considering given the pervasive income disparities among countries in the world economy. However, migration can *increase* inequality *within countries* in labor-scarce, receiving countries by moderating the growth of wages because of the associated increase in the supply of labor. In contrast, emigration can have an equalizing effect in sending countries by reducing the supply of labor and rising wages.

On the other hand, international migration is bound to have a positive effect on long run growth of receiving countries by keeping labor costs down, increasing the profitability of investment and rising national savings. For sending countries, the impact on growth depends on what is the pool of labor and human resources that emigrate. In labor- abundant, developing countries, with chronic unemployment (or labor surplus) the growth depressing effects of migration can be low (partly compensated by labor remittances). Nevertheless, emigration of highly- educated people, professionals and national investors, because of poor economic opportunities at home can have a detrimental effect on long run income levels and growth rates of sending countries by the flight of entrepreneurial capacities, human capital and skilled labor. From a global perspective, however, world output is expected to increase if people is free to move across the planet from areas of lower labor productivity to areas of higher productivity of labor. Also from the viewpoint of global economic freedoms, the result would be equally positive.

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**Table 1: Immigration to the USA, by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence, Fiscal Years 1820-1998**

Region / Country of Last Residence	1820-1870 (*)	1871-80	1881-90	1891-1900	1901-10	1911-20	1921-30
Immigrants from all countries	7,377,238	2,812,191	5,246,613	3,687,564	8,795,386	5,735,811	4,107,209
US population (mid-decade)	23,352,000	45,245,000	56,879,000	69,851,000	84,147,000	100,941,000	116,284,000
Total immigrants / US pop.	31.6%	6.2%	9.2%	5.3%	10.5%	5.7%	3.5%
Europe	6,717,328	2,271,925	4,735,484	3,555,352	8,056,040	4,321,887	2,463,194
Austria (a)	7,124	63,009	226,038	234,081	668,209	453,649	32,868
France	244,049	72,206	50,464	30,770	73,379	61,897	49,610
Germany (b)	2,333,944	718,182	1,452,970	505,152	341,498	143,945	412,202
Hungary	484	9,960	127,681	181,288	808,511	442,693	30,680
Ireland (c)	2,392,335	436,871	655,482	388,416	339,065	146,181	211,234
Italy	25,518	55,759	307,309	651,893	2,045,877	1,109,524	455,315
Soviet Union (d)	3,886	39,284	213,282	505,290	1,597,306	921,201	61,742
Sweden	na	115,922	391,776	226,266	249,534	95,074	97,249
United Kingdom (e)	1,401,213	548,043	807,357	271,538	525,950	341,408	339,570
Asia	106,529	124,160	69,942	74,862	323,543	247,236	112,059
China (f)	105,744	123,201	61,711	14,799	20,605	21,278	29,907
Hong Kong (g)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
India	196	163	269	68	4,713	2,082	1,886
Japan	186	149	2,270	25,942	129,797	83,837	33,462
Korea (h)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Philippines (i)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Turkey	301	404	3,782	30,425	157,369	134,066	33,824
Vietnam (g)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
America	349,171	404,044	426,967	38,972	361,888	1,143,671	1,516,716
Central Am. & Caribbean	50,596	14,114	29,446	33,615	115,740	140,583	90,668
Cuba (j)	na	na	na	na	na	na	15,901
Dominican Rep. (k)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
El Salvador (k)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Haiti (k)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Jamaica (l)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
North America	290,977	388,802	395,217	4,282	228,868	961,189	1,383,802
Canada and Newf. (m)	271,020	383,640	393,304	3,311	179,226	742,185	924,515
Mexico (n)	19,957	5,162	1,913	971	49,642	219,004	459,287
South America	7,598	1,128	2,304	1,075	17,280	41,899	42,215
Argentina (k)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Colombia (k)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Ecuador (k)	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Africa	648	358	857	350	7,368	8,443	6,286
Oceania	413	10,914	12,574	3,965	13,024	13,427	8,726

**Table 1: Immigration to the USA, by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence, Fiscal Years 1871-1998 (continued)**

Region / Country of Last Residence	1931-40	1941-50	1951-60	1961-70	1971-80	1981-90	1991-98	Tot. 179 yrs 1820-1998 (**)
Immigrants from all countries	528,431	1,035,039	2,515,479	3,321,677	4,493,314	7,338,062	7,605,068	64,599,082
US population (mid-decade)	127,859,000	140,474,000	165,931,000	194,303,000	215,973,000	239,279,000	263,044,000	270,561,000
Total immigrants / US pop.	0.4%	0.7%	1.5%	1.7%	2.1%	3.1%	2.9%	23.9%
Europe	347,566	621,147	1,325,727	1,123,492	800,368	761,550	1,132,002	38,233,062
Austria (a)	3,563	24,860	67,106	20,621	9,478	18,340	13,776	1,842,722
France	12,623	38,809	51,121	45,237	25,069	32,353	29,063	816,650
Germany (b)	114,058	226,578	477,765	190,796	74,414	91,961	72,792	7,156,257
Hungary	7,861	3,469	36,637	5,401	6,550	6,545	7,564	1,675,324
Ireland (c)	10,973	19,789	48,362	32,966	11,490	31,969	54,865	4,779,998
Italy	68,028	57,661	185,491	214,111	129,368	67,254	58,346	5,431,454
Soviet Union (d)	1,370	571	671	2,465	38,961	57,677	386,327	3,830,033
Sweden	3,960	10,665	21,697	17,116	6,531	11,018	10,325	1,257,133
United Kingdom (e)	31,572	139,306	202,824	213,822	137,374	159,173	128,671	5,247,821
Asia	16,595	37,028	153,249	427,642	1,588,178	2,738,157	2,346,751	8,365,931
China (f)	4,928	16,709	9,657	34,764	124,326	346,747	347,674	1,262,050
Hong Kong (g)	na	na	15,541	75,007	113,467	98,215	96,047	398,277
India	496	1,761	1,973	27,189	164,134	250,786	295,633	751,349
Japan	1,948	1,555	46,250	39,988	49,775	47,085	55,442	517,686
Korea (h)	na	107	6,231	34,526	267,638	333,746	136,651	778,899
Philippines (i)	528	4,691	19,307	98,376	354,987	548,764	433,768	1,460,421
Turkey	1,065	798	3,519	10,142	13,399	23,233	33,027	445,354
Vietnam (g)	na	na	335	4,340	172,820	280,782	241,641	699,918
America	160,037	354,804	996,944	1,716,374	1,982,735	3,615,225	3,777,281	16,844,829
Central Am. & Caribbean	21,363	71,390	167,842	571,543	875,766	1,340,139	1,245,292	4,768,097
Cuba (j)	9,571	26,313	78,948	208,536	264,863	144,578	136,711	885,421
Dominican Rep. (k)	1,150	5,627	9,897	93,292	148,135	252,035	300,065	810,201
El Salvador (k)	673	5,132	5,895	14,992	34,436	213,539	179,050	453,717
Haiti (k)	191	911	4,442	34,499	56,335	138,379	141,181	375,938
Jamaica (l)	na	na	8,869	74,906	137,577	208,148	139,124	568,624
North America	130,846	232,307	677,763	867,247	810,233	1,812,781	2,088,801	10,273,115
Canada and Newf. (m)	108,527	171,718	377,952	413,310	169,939	156,938	157,564	4,453,149
Mexico (n)	22,319	60,589	299,811	453,937	640,294	1,655,843	1,931,237	5,819,966
South America	7,803	21,831	91,628	257,940	295,741	461,847	443,152	1,693,441
Argentina (k)	1,349	3,338	19,486	49,721	29,897	27,327	22,581	153,699
Colombia (k)	1,223	3,858	18,048	72,028	77,347	122,849	104,539	399,892
Ecuador (k)	337	2,417	9,841	36,780	50,077	56,315	60,031	215,798
Africa	1,750	7,367	14,092	28,954	80,779	176,893	280,230	614,375
Oceania	2,483	14,551	12,976	25,122	41,242	45,205	45,584	250,206

Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and A. Madisson (1995) for the US population. (\*) The US population number shown in the period 1820-1870 correspond to 1850. (\*\*) The population for the period 1820-1998 (last column) correspond to 1998. Notes: (a) From 1938-45, data for Austria included in Germany. (b) From 1899-1919, Germany also included data for Poland. (c) Prior to 1926, data for Northern Ireland included in Ireland. (d) From 1899-1919, the Soviet Union included data for Poland. (e) Since 1926, data for United Kingdom refers to England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. (f) China includes Taiwan since 1957. (g) Data not reported separately until 1952. (h) Data not reported separately until 1948. (i) Prior to 1934, Philippines recorded as insular travel. (j) Data not reported separately until 1925. (k) Data not reported separately until 1932. (l) Data for Jamaica not collected until 1953 (previously, consolidated under British West Indies). (m) Correspond to Canada and Newfoundland. Prior to 1920, Canada and Newfoundland recorded as British North America. From 1871-98, figures include all British North America possessions. Land arrivals not completely enumerated until 1908. (n) No data available for Mexico for 1886-1894. na: not available.

**Table 2: Estimates of undocumented immigrants to the USA,  
1992-1996 (thousands)**

Country of Origin	1992 (October)	1996 (October)	Increase (percent)
All Countries	3,379	5,000	48.0
Latin America	2,219	3,765	69.7
Mexico	1,321	2,700	104.4
Dominican Republic	40	50	25.0
Haiti	88	105	19.3
Jamaica	42	50	19.0
Trinidad & Tobago	39	50	28.2
El Salvador	327	335	2.4
Guatemala	129	165	27.9
Honduras	61	90	47.5
Nicaragua	68	70	2.9
Colombia	59	65	10.2
Ecuador	45	55	22.2
Peru	na	30	.
Other Countries	470	389	-17.2
Ireland	36	na	.
Italy	67	na	.
Poland	91	70	-23.1
Portugal	31	na	.
India	28	33	17.9
Korea	na	30	.
Pakistan	30	41	36.7
Philippines	90	95	5.6
Canada	97	120	23.7

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service (1998), USA.

Notes: na: not available

**Table 3.- Foreign Population (total and as % of total population), residing in selected OECD countries (a)**

Countries / Yrs	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
<b>Asia and Oceania</b>										
Japan	941,000	984,500	1,075,300	1,218,900	1,281,600	1,320,700	1,354,000	1,362,400	1,415,100	1,482,700
% of total pop.	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2
Australia	na	na	na	3,753,000	na	na	na	na	3,908,300	na
% of total pop.	na	na	na	22.3	na	na	na	na	21.1	na
<b>Europe</b>										
Austria	344,000	387,200	456,100	532,700	623,000	689,600	713,500	723,500	728,200	732,700
% of total pop.	4.5	5.1	5.9	6.8	7.9	8.6	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.1
Belgium	868,800	880,800	904,500	922,500	909,300	920,600	922,300	909,800	911,900	903,200
% of total pop.	8.8	8.9	9.1	9.2	9.0	9.1	9.1	9.0	9.0	8.9
Denmark	142,000	150,600	160,600	169,500	180,100	189,000	196,700	222,700	237,700	249,600
% of total pop.	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.2	4.7	4.7
Finland	18,700	21,200	26,300	37,600	46,300	55,600	62,000	68,600	73,800	80,600
% of total pop.	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6
France	na	na	3,596,600	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
% of total pop.	na	na	6.3	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Germany	4,489,100	4,845,900	5,342,500	5,882,300	6,495,800	6,878,100	6,990,500	7,173,900	7,314,000	7,365,800
% of total pop.	7.3	7.7	8.4	7.3	8.0	8.5	8.6	8.8	8.9	9.0
Ireland	82,000	78,000	80,000	87,700	94,900	89,900	91,100	96,100	118,800	114,400
% of total pop.	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.2	3.1
Italy	645,400	490,400	781,100	863,000	925,200	987,400	922,700	991,400	1,095,600	1,240,700
% of total pop.	1.1	0.9	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.0	..
Luxembourg	105,800	106,900	113,100	117,800	122,700	127,600	132,500	138,100	142,800	147,700
% of total pop.	27.4	27.9	29.4	30.2	31.0	31.8	32.6	33.4	34.1	34.9
Netherlands	623,700	641,900	692,400	732,900	757,400	779,800	757,100	725,400	679,900	678,100
% of total pop.	4.2	4.3	4.6	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.7	4.4	..
Norway	135,900	140,300	143,300	147,800	154,000	162,300	163,000	160,800	157,500	158,000
% of total pop.	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6
Portugal	94,700	101,000	107,800	114,000	123,600	131,600	157,100	168,300	172,900	175,300
% of total pop.	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8
Spain	360,000	249,600	278,700	360,700	393,100	430,400	461,400	499,800	539,000	609,000
% of total pop.	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5
Sweden	421,000	456,000	483,700	493,800	499,100	507,500	573,400	531,800	526,600	522,000
% of total pop.	5.0	5.3	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.8	6.1	5.2	6.0	6.0
Switzerland	1,006,500	1,040,300	1,100,300	1,163,200	1,213,500	1,260,300	1,300,100	1,330,600	1,337,600	1,340,800
% of total pop.	15.2	15.6	16.3	17.1	17.6	18.1	18.6	18.9	18.9	19.0
United Kingd.	1,821,000	1,812,000	1,723,000	1,750,000	1,985,000	2,001,000	2,032,000	1,948,000	1,934,000	2,066,000
% of total pop.	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.6
<b>North America</b>										
United States	na	na	19,767,300	na	na	na	22,600,000	23,000,000	24,600,000	na
% of total pop.	na	na	7.9	na	na	na	8.7	8.8	9.3	na
Canada	na	na	na	4,342,900	na	na	na	na	4,971,100	na
% of total pop.	na	na	na	16.1	na	na	na	na	17.4	na
<b>Total (b)</b>	<b>12,099,600</b>	<b>12,386,600</b>	<b>36,832,600</b>	<b>22,690,300</b>	<b>15,804,600</b>	<b>16,531,400</b>	<b>39,429,400</b>	<b>40,051,200</b>	<b>50,864,800</b>	<b>17,866,600</b>
<b>(foreign pop.)</b>										

Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (World Bank).

Notes: (a) Foreign (or foreign-born) population is the number of foreign or foreign-born residents in a country. (b) Calculated from the data presented in this table. na: not available from this source.

**Table 4: Educational attainment of the Hispanic and other populations living in the USA  
(as percentage of persons of 25+ years old)**

Education Level / Years	Hispanic Population						Other Populations		
	Total	Mexicans	Puerto R.	Cubans	Central & South Am.	Other Hispanics	White	Afro- American	Asian
High School grad. or higher (percent)									
1991	39.0	33.0	43.1	46.6	47.3	53.8	61.3	49.2	67.6
1993	53.1	46.2	59.8	62.1	62.9	68.9	58.2	48.4	66.9
1995	53.4	46.5	61.2	64.8	64.2	68.4	58.0	49.5	61.9
1997	54.7	48.6	61.1	65.2	63.2	66.6	58.5	49.1	65.4
1998	55.6	48.3	63.9	67.8	64.9	72.2	58.8	50.7	65.0
BA degrees or higher (percent)									
1991	9.7	6.2	10.1	18.5	15.1	16.2	22.2	11.5	39.0
1993	9.0	5.9	8.0	16.5	15.1	15.1	22.6	12.2	42.0
1995	9.3	6.5	10.6	19.3	13.1	14.2	24.0	13.2	38.2
1997	10.3	7.4	10.8	19.7	14.8	14.9	24.6	13.3	42.2
1998	11.0	7.5	12.0	22.2	17.4	16.0	24.8	14.7	42.1
Persons 25+ yrs old (thousands)									
1991	11,208	6,518	1,261	784	1,658	986	136,299	17,096	4,158
1993	12,100	7,198	1,280	818	1,776	1,029	139,019	17,786	4,462
1995	14,171	8,737	1,437	820	2,082	1,095	141,113	18,457	4,200
1997	15,476	9,157	1,669	946	2,473	1,231	144,058	19,072	6,107
1998	16,004	9,649	1,682	952	2,599	1,163	145,078	19,376	6,381

Source: Statistical Abstract of the USA, various issues (1992-1999).

**Table 5: Income distribution per family and unemployment of the Hispanic and other populations living in the USA  
1990-1997**

Income-Poverty / Years	Hispanic Population						Other Populations		
	Total	Mexicans	Puerto R.	Cubans	Central & South Am.	Other Hispanics	White	Afro- American	Asian
Median Income per Family	US current Dollars								
1990	23,431	23,240	18,008	31,439	23,445	27,382	36,915	21,423	42,245
1992	23,912	23,714	20,301	31,015	23,649	28,562	38,909	21,161	na
1994	24,313	23,609	20,929	30,584	26,558	28,658	44,277	26,748	46,106
1996	26,179	25,347	23,646	35,616	29,960	26,171	44,756	26,522	49,105
1997	28,141	27,088	23,729	37,537	32,030	30,130	46,754	28,602	51,850
Families below poverty level	Percent								
1990	25.0	25.0	37.5	13.7	22.2	19.4	8.1	29.4	11.0
1992	26.2	26.4	32.5	15.2	27.0	21.8	8.9	30.9	12.0
1994	27.8	29.6	33.2	13.7	24.0	21.4	9.1	27.3	13.1
1996	26.4	27.7	33.1	12.5	19.0	29.3	8.6	26.1	12.6
1997	24.7	25.8	31.6	15.7	18.5	24.9	8.4	23.6	10.2
Income Distribution in 1997	Percent (except for Total Families)								
Total Families	6,961	4,292	770	383	1,018	498	59,515	8,408	2,381
Income < \$5000	5.1	5.1	6.8	2.1	4.4	5.4	2.1	6.9	2.9
Income \$5,000-\$9,999	8.7	8.1	15.5	7.3	5.3	11.0	3.2	10.1	2.7
Income \$10,000-\$14,999	10.9	11.6	10.5	11.5	8.7	8.8	5.1	9.8	5.3
Income \$15,000-\$24,999	20.1	21.5	19.9	15.1	19.0	14.5	12.5	17.7	9.2
Income \$25,000-\$34,999	15.3	16.0	11.9	11.5	16.1	15.5	12.7	14.2	9.8
Income \$35,000-\$49,999	17.2	17.1	13.9	14.9	20.3	18.7	17.7	15.5	17.8
Income >= \$50,000	22.8	20.5	21.4	37.3	26.1	25.9	46.6	25.9	52.2
Unemployment Rate	Percent								
1991	9.9	10.4	11.6	8.1	Na	na	6.0	12.4	6.3
1993	10.6	10.7	12.8	7.8	Na	na	6.0	12.9	5.7
1995	9.3	9.7	11.2	7.4	8.0	7.9	4.9	10.4	5.0
1997	7.7	7.7	9.8	6.6	7.0	7.6	4.2	10.0	4.7
1998	7.2	7.3	8.3	6.0	6.1	7.8	3.9	8.9	4.6

Source: Statistical Abstract of the USA, various issues (1992-1999), (na: not available).

**Table 6.- Inflows of asylum seekers (total) to selected OECD countries (a)**

Countries / years	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
<b>A.- Inflows of Asylum Seekers, total number</b>										
Europe										
Austria	21,900	22,800	27,300	16,200	4,700	5,100	5,900	7,000	6,700	13,800
Belgium	8,200	13,000	15,400	17,600	26,500	14,700	11,700	12,400	11,800	22,000
Denmark	4,600	5,300	4,600	13,900	14,300	6,700	5,100	5,900	5,100	5,700
Finland	200	2,700	2,100	3,600	2,000	800	800	700	1,000	1,300
France	61,400	54,800	47,000	28,900	27,600	26,000	20,400	17,400	21,400	21,800
Germany	121,300	193,100	256,100	438,200	322,600	127,200	127,900	116,400	104,400	98,700
Ireland	na	100	na	na	100	400	400	1,200	3,900	4,600
Italy	2,300	4,700	31,700	2,600	1,300	1,800	1,700	700	1,900	4,700
Luxembourg	100	100	200	100	200	200	200	300	400	1,600
Netherlands	13,900	21,200	21,600	20,300	35,400	52,600	29,300	22,900	34,400	45,200
Norway	4,400	4,000	4,600	5,200	12,900	3,400	1,500	1,800	2,300	8,300
Portugal	100	100	200	600	2,100	800	500	300	300	300
Spain	4,100	8,600	8,100	11,700	12,600	12,000	5,700	4,700	5,000	6,500
Sweden	30,000	29,400	27,400	84,000	37,600	18,600	9,000	5,800	9,600	13,000
Switzerland	24,400	35,800	41,600	18,000	24,700	16,100	17,000	18,000	24,000	41,200
United Kingdom	16,800	38,200	73,400	32,300	28,000	42,200	55,000	37,000	41,500	57,700
North America										
Canada	19,900	36,700	32,300	37,800	21,100	21,700	25,600	25,700	22,600	22,600
United States	101,700	73,600	56,300	104,000	144,200	146,500	154,500	128,200	79,800	50,800
Oceania										
Australia	500	3,800	17,000	4,100	4,600	4,200	5,100	6,000	9,300	7,800
Total (b)	435,800	548,000	666,900	839,100	722,500	501,000	477,300	412,400	385,400	427,600
<b>B.- Inflows of Asylum Seekers, as a percentage of inflows of foreign population (c)</b>										
Europe										
Belgium	18.9	25.7	28.5	31.9	50.0	26.3	22.0	23.9	24.0	na
Denmark	30.5	35.1	26.3	82.2	92.9	42.9	15.5	23.9	na	na
Finland	4.8	41.5	16.9	34.6	18.3	10.5	11.0	9.3	12.3	na
France	115.4	53.5	42.8	24.8	27.8	28.4	26.5	23.0	20.9	na
Germany	15.7	22.9	27.8	36.3	32.7	16.4	16.2	16.4	17.0	na
Luxembourg	1.2	1.1	2.0	1.0	2.2	2.2	2.1	3.3	4.1	na
Netherlands	21.3	26.1	25.6	24.5	40.4	76.9	43.7	29.7	44.9	na
Norway	23.8	25.5	28.6	30.2	57.8	19.0	9.1	10.5	10.5	na
Sweden	50.9	55.3	62.4	212.7	68.6	24.9	24.9	19.8	28.7	na
Switzerland	30.3	35.3	37.9	16.1	23.8	17.6	19.3	24.2	33.0	na
United Kingdom	na	na	na	15.8	14.7	21.8	26.7	17.1	17.5	na
North America										
Canada	10.4	17.1	14.0	15.0	8.2	9.7	12.0	11.4	10.5	na
United States	9.3	4.8	3.1	10.7	15.9	18.2	21.4	14.0	10.0	na
Oceania										
Australia	0.3	3.1	14.0	3.8	6.0	6.0	5.8	6.1	10.8	na

Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (World Bank).

Notes: (a) Asylum seekers are those who apply for permission to remain in the country for humanitarian reasons. (b) Calculated from the data presented in this table. (c) Inflows of foreign population are the gross arrivals of immigrants in the country, and it does not include asylum seekers. na: not available.

**Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries**

(thousands)				
Country of nationality / Years	1985	1990	1995	1997
<i>(unless otherwise indicated)</i>				
<b>Japan</b>				
Total foreign population	827.2	1,075.3	1,362.4	1,482.7
of which:				
Korea	683.3	687.9	666.4	645.4
China	74.9	150.3	223.0	252.2
Brazil	2.0	56.4	176.4	233.3
Philippines	12.3	49.1	74.3	93.3
United States	29.0	38.4	43.2	43.7
Peru	0.5	10.3	36.3	40.4
<i>Australia / Years</i>		<i>1986</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1996</i>
Total foreign population		3,247.4	3,753.3	3,908.2
of which:				
United Kingdom		1,083.1	1,122.4	1,072.5
New Zealand		211.7	276.1	291.4
Italy		261.9	254.8	238.2
Fmr. Yugoslavia		150.0	161.1	175.5
Vietnam		83.0	122.3	151.1
Greece		137.6	136.3	126.5
<b>Belgium</b>				
Total foreign population	846.5	904.3	909.8	903.2
of which:				
Italy	252.9	241.2	210.7	205.8
Morocco	123.6	141.7	140.3	132.8
France	92.3	94.3	100.1	103.6
Netherlands	59.6	65.3	77.2	82.3
Turkey	74.2	84.9	81.7	73.8
Spain	51.2	52.2	48.3	47.4
<i>Denmark / Years</i>		<i>1985</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1996</i>
Total foreign population	117.0	160.6	237.7	249.6
of which:				
Turkey	20.4	29.7	36.8	37.5
Fmr. Yugoslavia	7.9	10.0	32.2	33.9
United Kingdom	9.7	10.2	12.5	12.8
Norway	9.8	10.2	11.5	11.9
Somalia	..	0.6	9.7	11.9
Germany	8.2	8.4	11.4	11.9
<b>Finland</b>				
Total foreign population	17.0	26.6	68.6	80.6
of which:				
Fmr. USSR (a)	1.6	4.2	15.9	19.0
Estonia (a)	..	..	8.4	9.7
Sweden	4.9	6.1	7.0	7.5
Somalia	..	..	4.0	5.2
Fmr. Yugoslavia	..	..	2.4	2.8
Iraq	..	..	1.3	2.4
<i>France / Years</i>		<i>1975</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1990</i>
Total foreign population		3,442.4	3,714.2	3,596.6
of which:				
Portugal		758.9	767.3	649.7
Algeria		710.7	805.1	614.2
Morocco		260.0	441.3	572.7
Italy		462.9	340.3	252.8
Spain		497.5	327.2	216.0
Tunisia		139.7	190.8	206.3

**Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries**  
(thousands) (continued)

Country of nationality / Years	1985	1990	1995	1997
	<i>(unless otherwise indicated)</i>			
<b>Germany</b>				
Total foreign population	4,378.9	5,342.5	7,173.9	7,365.8
of which:				
Turkey	1,401.9	1,694.6	2,014.3	2,107.4
Fmr. Yugoslavia (b)	591.0	662.7	797.7	721.0
Italy	531.3	552.4	586.1	607.9
Greece	280.6	320.2	359.5	363.2
Poland	104.8	242.0	276.7	283.3
Bosnia Herzg. (c)	.	.	316.0	281.4
Croatia (c)	.	.	185.1	206.6
Austria	172.5	183.2	184.5	185.1
<b>Italy</b>				
Total foreign population	423.0	781.1	991.4	1,240.7
of which:				
Morocco	2.6	78.0	94.2	131.4
Albania	..	..	34.7	83.8
Philippines	7.6	34.3	43.4	61.3
United States	51.1	58.1	60.6	59.6
Tunisia	4.4	41.2	40.5	48.9
Fmr. Yugoslavia (d)	13.9	29.8	56.1	44.4
Germany	37.2	41.6	39.4	40.1
Romania	..	7.5	24.5	38.1
China	1.6	18.7	21.5	37.8
Senegal	0.3	25.1	24.0	34.8
Poland	..	17.0	22.0	31.3
<b>Luxembourg</b>				
Total foreign population	97.9	113.1	138.1	147.7
of which:				
Portugal	29.0	39.1	51.5	54.5
Italy	20.7	19.5	19.8	19.9
France	12.6	13.0	15.0	16.5
Belgium	8.5	10.1	11.8	13.2
Germany	8.9	8.8	9.7	10.0
Spain	2.2	2.5	2.8	..
<b>Netherlands</b>				
Total foreign population	552.5	692.4	725.4	678.1
of which:				
Morocco	116.4	156.9	149.8	135.7
Turkey	156.4	203.5	154.3	114.7
Germany	41.0	44.3	53.9	53.9
United Kingdom (e)	38.5	39.0	41.1	39.2
Fmr. Yugoslavia	11.7	13.5	33.5	28.4
Belgium	22.8	23.6	24.1	24.4
<b>Norway / Years</b>				
Total foreign population	101.5	143.3	157.5	158.0
of which:				
Sweden	10.0	11.7	17.3	20.6
Denmark	15.7	17.2	18.1	18.4
Bosnia Herzegov. (f)	..	..	11.5	11.6
United Kingdom	12.5	11.8	10.9	10.8
United States	10.0	9.5	8.7	8.6
Pakistan	8.4	11.4	8.6	7.5

**Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries**  
(thousands) (continued)

Country of nationality / Years	1985	1990	1995	1997
<i>(unless otherwise indicated)</i>				
<b>Portugal</b>				
Total foreign population	94.7	107.8	168.3	175.3
of which:				
Cape Verde	27.1	28.8	38.7	39.8
Brazil	9.3	11.4	19.9	20.0
Angola	4.4	5.3	15.8	16.3
Guinea-Bissau	3.1	4.0	12.3	12.8
United Kingdom	7.1	8.5	11.5	12.3
Spain	7.1	7.5	8.9	8.8
<b>Spain</b>				
Total foreign population	242.0	278.8	499.8	609.8
of which:				
Morocco	5.8	11.4	74.9	111.1
United Kingdom	39.1	55.5	65.3	68.3
Germany	28.5	31.2	41.9	49.9
Portugal	23.3	22.8	37.0	38.2
France	17.8	19.7	30.8	34.3
Italy	10.3	10.8	19.8	22.6
Peru	1.7	2.6	15.1	21.2
Dominican Republic	1.2	1.5	14.5	20.4
Argentina	9.7	12.1	18.4	17.2
<b>Sweden</b>				
Total foreign population	388.6	483.7	531.8	552.0
of which:				
Finland	138.6	119.7	104.9	101.3
Fmr. Yugoslavia	38.4	41.1	38.4	33.6
Norway	26.4	38.2	32.3	31.0
Iran	8.3	39.0	29.3	26.2
Denmark	25.1	28.6	26.5	25.4
Iraq	3.5	7.7	21.3	24.8
Turkey	21.5	25.5	20.3	18.4
Poland	15.5	15.7	16.0	15.8
Germany	12.0	13.0	13.4	14.4
Chile	9.2	19.9	13.0	11.9
<b>Switzerland</b>				
Total foreign population	939.7	1,100.3	1,330.6	1,340.8
of which:				
Italy	392.5	378.7	358.9	342.3
Fmr. Yugoslavia	69.5	140.7	294.2	313.5
Portugal	30.9	85.6	134.8	136.3
Germany	81.0	83.4	90.9	94.7
Spain	108.4	116.1	101.4	94.0
Turkey	50.9	64.2	78.6	79.6
<b>United Kingdom / Years</b>				
Total foreign population	1,731.0	1,723.0	1,948.0	2,207.0
of which:				
Ireland	569	478	443	448
India	138	156	114	139
United States	86	102	110	120
Ctr. & East. Europe (g)	68	58	75	100
Western Africa	43	37	87	90
Italy	83	75	80	89
Carib. & Guyana	135	82	82	79
Germany	36	41	51	75

**Table A-1: Foreign population, by nationality, residing in selected OECD countries**  
(thousands) (continued)

Country of nationality / Years	1985	1990	1995	1997
	<i>(unless otherwise indicated)</i>			
United States / Years		1970	1980	1990
Total foreign population		9,619.3	14,079.9	19,767.3
of which:				
Mexico		759.7	2,199.2	4,298.0
Philippines		184.8	501.4	912.7
Canada		812.4	842.9	744.8
Cuba		439.0	607.8	737.0
Germany		833.0	849.4	711.9
United Kingdom		708.2	669.1	640.1
Italy		1008.7	831.9	580.6
Korea		88.7	289.9	568.4
Vietnam		..	231.1	543.3
China		172.2	286.1	529.8
India		51.0	206.1	450.4
Canada / Years		1986	1991	1996
Total foreign population		3,908.0	4,342.9	4,971.1
of which:				
United kingdom		793.1	717.7	655.5
Italy		366.8	351.6	332.1
United States		282.0	249.1	244.7
Hong Kong (China)		77.4	152.5	241.1
India		130.1	173.7	235.9
China		119.2	157.4	231.1
Poland		156.8	184.7	193.4
Philippines		82.2	123.3	184.6
Germany		189.6	180.5	181.7
Portugal		139.6	161.2	158.8

Source: Trends in International Migration, 1999 (OECD).

Notes: (a) Figures include Ingrians (ethnic Finns). (b) From 1993 on, Serbia and Montenegro. (c) Included in Former Yugoslavia until 1993. Notes: (d) Excluding the data for Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina. (e) Excluding Hong Kong (China). (f) Included in former Yugoslavia until 1992. (g) Including former URSS.

**Table A-2: Inflows of asylum seekers, by nationality, to selected OECD countries**  
(thousands)

Country of nationality / Years	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
<b>France</b>									
Total inflows of asylum seekers	61.4	54.8	47.4	28.9	27.6	26	20.4	17.4	21.4
of which:									
Romania	na	3.3	2.4	2.2	2.7	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.1
China	na	0.8	2.4	2.1	0.4	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.7
Sri Lanka	na	2.5	3.4	4.0	2.8	1.7	1.1	na	1.6
Turkey	na	11.8	9.7	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.7	1.2	1.4
Zaire	na	5.8	4.3	3.1	2.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2
Former Yugoslavia	na	0.4	0.9	2.4	2.5	1.9	1.4	0.9	1.0
Former USSR	na	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.6	1.0
Algeria	na	0.1	0.2	0.6	1.1	2.4	1.8	0.6	0.9
<b>Germany</b>									
Total inflows of asylum seekers	121.3	193.1	256.1	438.2	322.6	127.2	127.9	116.4	104.4
of which:									
Turkey	20.0	22.1	23.9	28.3	19.1	19.1	25.5	23.8	16.8
Former Yugoslavia	19.4	22.1	74.9	122.7	74.1	30.4	26.2	18.1	14.8
Iraq	na	na	na	na	1.2	2.1	6.9	10.8	14.1
Afganistan	3.7	7.3	7.3	6.4	5.5	5.6	7.5	5.7	4.7
Sri Lanka	na	4.4	5.6	na	3.3	4.8	6.0	5.0	4.0
Iran	5.8	7.3	8.6	3.8	2.7	3.4	3.9	4.8	3.8
Armenia	na	na	na	na	na	2.1	3.4	3.5	2.5
Pakistan	na	na	na	na	na	2.0	3.1	2.6	2.3
Zaire	na	na	na	na	na	na	2.5	3.0	1.9
India	na	na	na	na	na	na	2.7	2.8	1.9
Bosnia Herzegovina	na	na	na	6.2	21.2	7.3	4.9	3.5	1.7
Vietnam	1.0	9.4	8.1	12.3	11.0	3.4	2.6	1.1	1.5
Nigeria	na	5.4	8.4	na	na	na	na	1.7	1.1
<b>Netherlands</b>									
Total inflows of asylum seekers	13.9	21.2	21.6	20.3	35.4	52.6	29.3	22.9	34.4
of which:									
Iraq	na	0.4	0.7	0.8	3.2	2.9	2.4	4.4	9.6
Afganistan	na	0.6	0.3	0.4	1.5	2.5	1.9	3.0	5.9
Former Yugoslavia	na	0.6	2.7	5.6	10.2	13.4	6.1	2.0	3.8
Former USSR	na	0.2	1.0	0.6	1.6	4.5	1.9	1.7	2.0
Sri Lanka	na	3.0	1.8	1.0	1.9	1.8	1.3	1.5	1.5
Somalia	na	1.7	1.7	4.2	4.3	5.4	4.0	1.5	1.3
Iran	na	1.7	1.7	1.3	2.6	6.1	2.7	1.5	1.3
China	na	na	na	na	0.9	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.2
Turkey	na	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.1
<b>Sweden</b>									
Total inflows of asylum seekers	30	29.4	27.4	84	37.6	18.6	9.0	5.8	9.6
of which:									
Iraq	na	2.0	2.2	3.2	2.3	1.7	1.8	1.6	3.1
Former Yugoslavia	na	2.3	13.2	69.4	29.0	10.6	2.4	1.1	3.0
Somalia	na	2.4	1.4	2.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.4	0.4
Iran	na	4.3	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4
Russian Federation	na	na	na	na	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Turkey	na	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Afganistan	na	na	na	na	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2
Syria	na	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	na	na	na	0.1
Lebanon	na	3.6	0.3	0.2	0.1	na	na	na	0.1
Ethiopia	na	2.0	0.5	0.2	0.1	ng	ng	0.1	0.1

**Table A-2: Inflows of asylum seekers, by nationality, to selected OECD countries (continued)**  
(thousands)

Country of nationality / Years	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
<b>Switzerland</b>									
Total inflows of asylum seekers	24.4	35.8	41.6	18	24.7	16.1	17	18	24
of which:									
Former Yugoslavia	1.4	5.6	14.2	na	12.1	7.5	9.0	7.5	6.9
Albania	na	na	na	na	2.0	na	na	na	3.1
Sri Lanka	4.8	4.8	7.3	na	1.7	1.5	1.0	2.0	2.1
Turkey	9.4	7.3	4.3	na	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4
Somalia	na	na	na	na	2.3	na	na	0.7	0.9
Angola	na	na	na	na	na	1.1	0.5	na	0.3
Lebanon	2.5	5.5	na	na	na	na	na	na	0.2
<b>United Kingdom</b>									
Total inflows of asylum seekers	16.8	38.2	73.4	32.3	28	42.2	55	37	41.5
of which:									
Former Yugoslavia	ng	ng	0.3	5.6	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.0	2.3
Somalia	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.8	3.5	1.8	2.7
Sri Lanka	1.8	3.3	3.8	2.1	2.0	2.4	2.1	1.3	1.8
Former USSR	ng	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.4	2.0
Afganistan	na	na	na	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.7	1.1
Turkey	2.4	1.6	2.1	1.9	1.5	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.4
Pakistan	0.3	1.5	3.2	1.7	1.1	1.8	2.9	1.9	1.6
China	na	na	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.8	1.9
Poland	na	na	na	0.1	0.2	0.4	1.2	0.9	0.6
Nigeria	ng	0.1	0.3	0.6	1.7	4.3	5.8	2.9	1.5
Iraq	0.2	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.1
Algeria	ng	ng	ng	0.2	0.3	1.0	1.9	0.7	0.7
India	0.6	1.5	2.1	1.5	1.3	2.0	3.3	2.2	1.3
Kenya	ng	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	1.1	1.4	1.2	0.6
Zaire	0.5	2.6	7.0	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.7
Other countries	4.0	12.2	22.2	6.9	8.5	11.9	14.6	9.6	11.2
<b>United States</b>									
Total inflows of asylum seekers	101.7	73.6	123.5	104	144.2	146.5	154.5	128.2	79.8
of which:									
El Salvador	na	na	ng	6.8	14.6	18.6	75.9	65.6	na
Guatemala	na	na	ng	43.9	34.2	34.4	23.2	13.9	na
Mexico	na	na	ng	0.6	6.4	9.3	9.7	9.7	na
India	na	na	ng	3.2	5.7	4.5	3.4	4.7	na
Haiti	na	na	ng	5.4	10.9	9.5	2.6	4.4	na
China	na	na	ng	3.5	14.5	10.9	5.0	3.5	na
Former USSR	na	na	63.2	4.5	0.4	0.1	2.4	2.4	na
Nicaragua	na	na	ng	2.1	3.2	4.7	1.9	2.0	na
Honduras	na	na	ng	1.1	2.8	4.4	3.2	1.8	na
Philippines	na	na	ng	4.0	4.0	2.4	1.0	1.7	na
Pakistan	na	na	ng	3.3	4.5	3.3	2.5	1.4	na
Mauritania	na	na	ng	na	na	na	na	1.3	na
Somalia	na	na	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	1.2	na
Ethiopia	na	na	4.9	1.0	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.1	na
Bangladesh	na	na	ng	1.0	3.8	3.7	1.9	1.0	na
Other countries	na	na	54.9	23.3	37.9	39.7	20.8	12.5	na

Source: Trends in International Migration, 1999 (OECD) (na: not available, ng: nil, or negligible).

